March 11, 1999
Jaqueline D. Rogers
U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, EH-51
Docket Number EH-RM-98-BRYLM
1000 Independence Ave, SW
Washington, DC 20585
Dear Ms. Rogers,
Submitted herein are Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety's
(CCNS's) comments on the Department of Energy's Proposed Chronic
Beryllium Disease Prevention Program Rule, 10 CFR Part
850.1
CCNS is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit public education organization that
focuses on nuclear safety and environmental issues relating to the
DOE nuclear weapons complex, particularly as they pertain to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL). We have extensive experience with Clean Air
Act issues at LANL.
CCNS believes, due to the Department's admitted uncertainty
with regards to beryllium exposure hazards, that the Department's
interim proposed standards are too liberal. Until further
evidence points towards specific dose amounts as hazardous, the
Department should err on the side of caution. Dr. Meril Eisenbud,
as stated in the supplemental information to the proposed rule,
concluded in his January 1998 publication that it "appears" that
the current 2µg/m3 standard is not protective enough. He
suggested the need to develop an animal model that will increase
the understanding of the etiology of Chronic Beryllium Disease.
The supplemental information to the proposed rule points to the
unknown variables of "(1) The effect of peak exposures (such that
most of the exposure results from short-term episodes); (2)
inadequacy of area monitoring in reflecting actual exposure; (3)
chemical composition, etc., that may effect bioavailability; (4)
inadequate monitoring of beryllium composition/species associated
with exposures; and (5) the effect of genetic
predisposition."2
With this in mind, we do not believe
that the proposed short-term exposure limit (STEL) of 10 µg/m3 and
the 8-hour time weighted average (TWA) action level of 0.5 µg/m3
is conservative. The evidence indicates that the Department has
no concrete evidence to support its conclusions for STELs or TWA
Permissible Exposure Limits (PEL).
Since it is still unknown what level of beryllium can be
dangerous for some individuals, the action level in the proposed
rule should be the detection of airborne beryllium, period. All
facilities where airborne beryllium is detected should then be
regulated as described throughout the rest of the proposed rule
(i.e., protective equipment, respirators, laundry, change rooms,
etc.). Furthermore, DOE should direct whatever the necessary
funding may be to independent studies who have as their goal the
resolution of these uncertainties and the formulation of beryllium
exposure limits that truly protect occupational health. It is
shameful that after over a half-century of beryllium work, that
the nuclear weapons industry still entertains such a large degree
of uncertainty regarding beryllium health effects.
The Department held only three poorly publicized and poorly
attended hearings at Rocky Flats, Oak Ridge and Washington, DC.
Why was there such a limited effort to obtain public input on this
matter? Why was no hearing held at LANL, when the lab has not
only been a historic site of beryllium activities, but is also
expanding it beryllium operations in conjunction with (but not
limited to) stockpile plutonium pit production? We note that LANL
is fourth among DOE sites (Y-12, Rocky Flats and Mound, in that
order) for the number of workers that have been potentially
exposed above the action level.3 With expanded beryllium operations
that number is likely to grow. In any event, due to the end of
DOE Defense Programs missions at Mound and Rocky Flats, LANL is
probably bound to move into the dubious distinction of second
place. It is inexcusable that DOE did not hold a public hearing
of this proposed rule change in the Los Alamos area.
Our concern is further fueled by the fact that, according to
the January 1999 DOE Final LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement (SWEIS), ambient air monitoring for beryllium at the lab
ceased in 1995 and the State of New Mexico standard for beryllium
was repealed in that same year. While we recognize that this is
not strictly relevant to occupational beryllium issues,
nevertheless these are important factors that heighten public
concern. At the very moment that LANL beryllium operations are
being expanded, DOE is essentially proposing to reinforce the
status quo in the form of the 1949 AEC standard of 2 µg/meter 3
(albeit with the new but inadequate action level), when that
standard has already failed to adequately protect the workers.
We further note that these consolidated beryllium operations
at LANL will take place primarily in Technical Area 3, which is
the most densely populated technical area and contiguous to the
Los Alamos townsite. As background, LANL has been in long term
violation of the Clean Air Act4; admittedly has had a history of past
unpermitted beryllium sources5; and possesses a substandard safety
record, even by the relatively low standards of the DOE nuclear
weapons complex.6
All of these factors, in our view,
argue for the implementation of a very cautious PEL at
LANL.
Related to this, we note that ¤850.2, Applicability, of the
proposed rule exempts "DOE laboratory operations." We believe
that, in the case of LANL, this deserves the utmost scrutiny. DOE
needs to clarify whether this measure categorically exempts LANL
as an entire institution, or only those programmatic elements
devoted to research and not production. And where does DOE draw
the line in the current downsized nuclear weapons complex where
many production activities have been relocated to the nuclear
weapons labs? In any event, CCNS opposes this laboratory
exemption in its entirety, and urges DOE to withdraw that
exemption. We particularly would oppose the application of this
exemption to production operations at LANL.
With respect to "laboratory operations" that DOE proposes to
exempt, some of these at LANL may possibly constitute significant
beryllium emissions sources. Under the expanded nuclear weapons
activities alternative articulated in the 1999 Final LANL SWEIS,
DOE declares its intention to eventually triple the number of
explosive dynamic experiments at the lab. LANL has a long history
of such experiments. As an indication of the volume of these
experiments, the old 1979 LANL SWEIS stated that by that time
100,000 kilograms of uranium had been blown up. As a result of
expanded dynamic experiments, DOE states that an increase to the
public radioactive dose is expected. As these experiments are
directed at research of nuclear weapons primaries, it is
inevitable that beryllium is involved. Our question is to what
extent will the proposed rule govern "diffuse" beryllium sources
(such as these experiments), analogous to radioactive diffuse
sources that DOE now concedes require regulation under Subpart H
of the Clean Air Act. Can DOE demonstrate that these experiments,
to the extent that they are either contained or simply dispersed
into the atmosphere, do not exceed the old 2 microgram/cubic meter
standard for workers (or, for that matter, EPA' s community
permissible exposure limit)?7
Or will dynamic experiments simply be
exempted as laboratory operations?
According to a media article, LANL intends to declare some
aspects of its beryllium operations exempt from Clean Air Act
regulations.8
What is the basis for this? Would LANL
similarly claim that certain beryllium operations would be
exempted from the proposed rule?
With the question of laboratory exemptions in mind, CCNS
supports the uniform application of the proposed rule (but with a
more stringent standard and action level) to all DOE sites and all
DOE subcontractors. We applaud that "the regulatory requirements
of this proposed rule would by operation of law apply to DOE
contracts. Accordingly, the application and enforcement of this
proposed rule would not be subject to the Work Smart Standards or
other related processes."9
We note LANL's long term hostility to
DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of
Operations10, for which LANL's Work Smart Standards
were formulated as a (in our view, suspect) substitute. We urge
DOE to hold firm to the principle of uniform application of the
proposed rule across the nuclear weapons complex.
Other provisions of the proposed rule that CCNS supports
are:
- The creation of site baseline
beryllium inventories;
- The requirement that DOE
contractors provide appropriate respiratory equipment to all
beryllium workers, but triggered by a more stringent OSHA time-
weighted average permissible exposure limit;
- Mandatory regulated areas,
change rooms and protective clothing;
- More stringent beryllium waste
disposal practices;
- The implementation of beryllium
emergency response procedures;
- The establishment of medical
surveillance programs for workers, with appropriate measures for
medical consent and protecting privacy;
- The implementation of beryllium
training programs;
- Increased use of warning signs
and labels;
- The establishment of a beryllium registry; and
- The establishment of performance
feedback loops.
We urge DOE to take steps to ensure that all of these elements
are instituted at LANL, as they should be at all sites.
Thank you for this opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
Jay Coghlan,
Colin King,
CCNS LANL Program Director
CCNS LANL Program Asst.
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