

January 17, 2007

By email to: Complex2030@nnsa.doe.gov

Theodore A. Wyka
Complex 2030 SEIS Document Manager
Office of Transformation
U.S. Department of Energy, NA-10.1
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

Re: CCNS Scoping Comments to the Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement – Complex 2030 SEIS

Dear Mr. Wyka,

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety (CCNS), a Santa Fe based research and advocacy non-governmental organization, makes the following scoping comments about the proposed Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, also known as the Complex 2030 SEIS. 71 FR 61731, Oct. 19, 2006.

On November 29, 2006, the JASONS released a report that found plutonium pits are not aging as quickly as the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have reported in the past. In fact, the JASONS found that the plutonium pits will age two times more slowly and be effective for at least 100 years or more. For example, if a pit were manufactured and certified today at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), it would be expected to be effective until at least 2107. Therefore, the Complex 2030 SEIS proposal is premature.

DOE/NNSA must return to the drawing board, consider all the scoping comments and come back to the public with a new Notice of Intent (NOI) for a new proposal which reflects this significant development about plutonium aging and the public's comments. In the alternative, CCNS submits the following scoping comments regarding the current Complex 2030 proposal. We incorporate our draft LANL Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) comments into these comments by reference.

1. Alternatives

The NOI states "NNSA does not believe it is necessary to identify additional alternatives beyond those present in the [Stockpile Stewardship and Management] PEIS." However, given that the final Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS was released in 1996 – over a decade ago – there is an essential need for DOE to identify

additional alternatives. Further, the world has changed dramatically in the past decade. The Complex 2030 proposal to create new nuclear weapons will only fuel the flames of war. There is an immediate need for meaningful and productive mediation, negotiation and arbitration to resolve conflicts. These are the measures that must be considered and implemented by the U.S. government.

a. The NOI states, “nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of United States national security policy.” This is a policy that a majority of Americans do not support. DOE/NNSA must analyze for an alternative where nuclear deterrence is not the cornerstone of U.S. national security policy.

CCNS supports the “Constitutional Alternative.” Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states, “All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” DOE must analyze for an alternative in which the U.S. complies with Article VI of the U.S. Constitution. DOE must also analyze for compliance with Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This alternative must analyze for the following:

- i. Dismantlement of all weapons in the U.S. stockpile beginning immediately. Complete dismantlement must be accomplished by 2030, if not before. Prioritization, funding and scheduling must be shifted into a focus on cleanup technologies and renewable energy.
- ii. Full compliance with Treaties ratified in the past, present and considerations for those to be ratified in the future. Please include a list of treaties, description and evaluation of the level of compliance for each alternative
- iii. Describe who would and would not benefit from total disarmament.
- iv. Provide examples of threats that cannot be deterred with the existing stockpile.
- v. Describe other means than nuclear deterrence, such as negotiations, diplomacy and additional treaties, which could handle emerging threats.

b. The NOI states “replacement warhead design concepts may be pursued under the alternatives.” DOE/NNSA must:

- i. Clarify the role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program as currently envisioned in Complex 2030. What decision making process will determine if the replacement warhead design concepts are to be pursued? How will this decision be coordinated with the Complex 2030 SEIS and ROD?
- ii. Analyze the environmental impacts for all replacement warhead design concepts in the draft Complex 2030 SEIS.
- iii. Describe any needed repairs or component replacements that the current complex is not able to accomplish.

c. Reduced Operations Alternative: The NOI defines ‘capability based capacity’ as “the capability to manufacture and assemble nuclear weapons at a nominal level.”

Please provide the specific definition of 'nominal level,' as well as the justification for this determination.

d. Please explain how the proposed No Action Alternative and the Reduced Operations Alternative differ to such an extent as would require analysis in a complex-wide SEIS. Specifically,

- i. Neither alternative includes construction of a consolidated plutonium center. The EIS analysis of increasing plutonium pit production capabilities at LANL has already been included in the draft LANL Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS).
- ii. Consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials and elimination of Duplicate Facilities: Please describe whether these merit a complex-wide analysis? In contrast, consolidation of materials and programs within specific sites does not necessitate a complex wide analysis.
- iii. Flight Testing: Please explain.
- iv. Consider Reduction of Production Capacities at Pantex, Y-12 and Savannah River Site: reduction of production capacities at Pantex and Y-12 have already been considered in the SSM PEIS Record of Decision (ROD).
- v. Dismantlement activities: How is "NNSA would continue dismantlement activities" different from "the status quo" of the No Action Alternative.

e. The No Action Alternative must truly be a no action alternative; one where DOE conducts no further nuclear weapons activities and cleans up the contamination that is spreading through the air, flowing in surface and ground water and is being buried in disposal sites throughout the complex. If DOE chooses the No Action Alternative as the "status quo," then DOE must provide the legal justification for doing so in the draft Complex 2030 SEIS.

2. Need for Stand Alone draft Complex 2030 SEIS

In order to facilitate meaningful public involvement the draft Complex 2030 SEIS must be a stand-alone document. In addition, significant changes in the security environment necessitate a full analysis.

a. Public Involvement: The NOI references over 14 documents, which if you stack one on top of the other, exceeds a meter. Further, other documents have been tiered off of those documents. The amount of preparation required to write informed comments would require hours and hours of review. DOE is making an unreasonable request of the public in the amount of time that would be required to write informed comments. Therefore, the proposed transformation must be described in a single stand-alone document, with minimal reference to other documents.

b. Significant Changes: The terrorist attacks of September 11 dramatically changed the national security environment. A recent federal court decision requires that the adverse consequences of potential terrorist attacks or intentional sabotage at DOE nuclear facilities must be analyzed. Such an analysis was not included in past documents.

3. 180-Day Comment Period for Complex 2030 draft SEIS

If DOE does not heed the concerned voices of the public and presents a draft Complex 2030 SEIS that is not a stand alone document, then the public must be provided with at least 180 days to make comments. Given the amount of material that must be reviewed, a 180-day or longer comment period is necessary in order for the public to make informed comments on the draft Complex 2030 SEIS. In the alternative, should DOE/NNSA decide to make the draft document a stand alone document, then the public must be provided with at least 90 days to make informed comments.

4. Accessible Language

The draft document must be written in such a way that the public can easily understand what is being said. For example, the NOI states that the “baseline that will be used for the analyses of programs and facility needs in the SEIS is 1,700 – 2,200 operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons, in addition to augmentation weapons, reliability-reserve weapons and weapons required to meet NATO commitments.” The draft SEIS must define and describe using terms that the general public will understand.

a. For clarity and ease in reading it is essential that all scientific, technical and legal terms are defined the first time they are used in each chapter, as well as in a cumulative glossary at the end of the document. This can be done either in the text or in a text box on the side of the page.

b. In order to make the document understandable and easily accessible, the context must be given for all terms and phrases that have reference to weapons activities and human health impacts.

c. DOE/NNSA must ensure that the purpose of the projects are clearly stated and include the full ramifications of what is being discussed. Nuclear weapons activities cannot be hidden within vague technical descriptions.

d. The health effects of all toxic, radioactive and hazardous materials must be clearly listed the first time these materials are mentioned in a chapter, regardless of amount, without diluted qualification of greater or lesser amounts.

5. Other NEPA Documents

DOE/NNSA must clarify the position of the Complex 2030 PEIS in relation to other NEPA documents. Specifically CCNS has questions regarding:

a. LANL draft or final SWEIS: The NOI states that “Any decisions made pursuant to the LANL Site-Wide EIS will be included in the Complex 2030 SEIS.” The draft Complex 2030 SEIS, as well as the new draft or final LANL SWEIS, must explain the timeline for the two documents. CCNS understands that the new draft or final LANL Site-Wide EIS may be released this summer, possibly in the same timeframe as the draft Complex 2030 SEIS. DOE must ensure that the timeline for the release of the documents makes logical sense. For informed decision making, it does not make sense for the draft Complex 2030 SEIS to be released before the new draft or final LANL SWEIS.

Further, CCNS found the draft LANL SWEIS to be incomplete, inadequate and technically indefensible. Three documents were missing from the draft LANL SWEIS, including the performance assessment for Area G, the low-level nuclear waste dump; a seismic report for the TA-55 area; as well as the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry public health assessment. Apparently, the ATSDR assessment has been finalized, but CCNS has not received a copy. Based on the missing documents, we recommended that DOE withdraw the draft LANL SWEIS and prepare a new draft for public review.

b. The Modern Pit Facility: The NOI states that the draft 2003 Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility (draft MPF EIS) has been canceled. The draft MPF EIS was referenced over 60 times in the draft LANL SWEIS. DOE must explain in the draft Complex 2030 SEIS how the draft LANL SWEIS may proceed under these circumstances. DOE must explain how the draft LANL SWEIS may be used for the analysis to be done in this document when it is based upon not only a draft document, but one which has been canceled.

6. Cost Comparison and Benefit Analysis

The NOI states that the proposed action is to “Transform to a More Modern, Cost-Effective Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex 2030).” Therefore, DOE/NNSA must include a complete cost comparison and benefit analysis in the draft SEIS to the following standards:

a. The cost benefit analysis must be made according to standard accounting practices.

b. A life cycle budget for the proposed Complex 2030 that includes not only includes the cost of construction, but operation, decommissioning and waste disposal.

7. Possible Weapon Use

DOE/NNSA must analyze for the range of impacts from using a nuclear weapon, whether it is one in the current stockpile, an advanced concept or reliable replacement warhead (RRW). The analysis must include the use of the smallest nuclear weapon to the largest.

8. Decommissioning Facilities

All facilities which are built must at some point be decommissioned, the land cleaned up and the waste safely disposed of. Please include an analysis of the environmental and human health impacts and the cost of decommissioning, cleaning up and waste disposal for all facilities which DOE proposes to construct, as well as existing facilities that will be demolished as a result of the proposal.

9. Number of Weapons

The draft SEIS must list the number of augmentation weapons, reliability-reserve weapons and weapons to fulfill NATO commitments.

10. Nuclear Testing

The NOI states that DOE/NNSA intends to maintain test readiness as a part of Complex 2030. DOE/NNSA must not include maintained test readiness in the proposal. In the alternative, please answer the following questions:

- a. What are the environmental impacts of maintaining test readiness?
- b. Are the impacts from a hypothetical future test considered as a part of the potential impacts from maintaining test readiness? CCNS objects to nuclear testing and to maintaining the capability to do so.
- c. How is it possible to certify the design of a nuclear weapon without testing?
- d. What have been and what are anticipated to be the national and international environmental and public health impacts from past nuclear weapons testing.
- e. What is the projected cost of compensating those who have been or will be harmed as provided by the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA)?
- f. What have been the impacts from past nuclear testing? The analysis must include impacts to down winders, as well as on-site workers.

11. Consolidated Plutonium Center (CPC)

CCNS objects to the construction and operations of a consolidated plutonium center. Further, in the summer of 2003 during the Modern Pit Facility hearings in Northern New Mexico, no one spoke in support of such a facility. In fact, concerned people spoke eloquently against such a facility.

The NOI states that certain “DOE sites are not considered reasonable alternative locations because they do not satisfy certain criteria such as population encroachment, or mission compatibility or synergy with the site’s existing mission.” Please include additional criteria, including, but not limited to, Environmental Justice, environmental safety threats (such as wildfire, drought and changing climate due to global warming) and regional cumulative impacts.

12. Concentration and Proximity of Sites within New Mexico

There are four sites in New Mexico which will be implicated by this decision: LANL, Sandia National Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).

- a. DOE/NNSA must consider the synergistic impact of the location of two of the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories located within 60-miles of one another in New Mexico.
- b. DOE/NNSA must consider the cumulative psychological impact of living in a state with four sites devoted to nuclear weapons activities, as well as being the birthplace of the atomic bomb, and the site of its first detonation.
- c. DOE/NNSA must analyze for the many Environmental Justice issues in New Mexico.

13. Existing Environmental Impacts at LANL

The NOI mentions that LANL may be the location for expanded pit production, as well as for the Consolidated Plutonium Center. The proposed Complex 2030 activities will generate more transuranic waste for which there is no disposal pathway. These facilities will also create more air emissions and discharges to surface and ground water. Complex 2030 should be a proposal to ensure full cleanup of all of the DOE sites by 2030 if not before. The Complex sites must be cleaned up to a standard where a pregnant subsistence farmer and her offspring could live, hunt, grow food and drink water from the springs for their entire lifetime.

- a. Transuranic Waste: As explained in the comments of Southwest Research and Information Center about the draft LANL Site-Wide EIS, generation of additional transuranic waste at LANL will result in the long-term indefinite storage and disposal

of transuranic waste at LANL. LANL will become the second WIPP site in New Mexico. The Expanded Operations Alternative in the draft LANL Site-Wide EIS states that more than 25,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste would be generated, which may be comparable to that generated as a result of activities under the Complex 2030 proposal. However, there is 17,130 cubic meters of disposal capacity for LANL waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), the disposal location for transuranic waste. Therefore, any transuranic waste generated at LANL will stay at LANL for long-term storage and disposal. The draft Complex 2030 SEIS must analyze for the impacts of LANL becoming the second transuranic waste disposal facility in New Mexico.

b. Ground Water: The DOE Office of Inspector General responded to allegations about the problems with the wells constructed at LANL to characterize the hydrogeologic conditions below the site and because of poor well construction, ground water samples are being collected that are not representative of actual conditions. DOE Inspector General *Inspection Report: Characterization Wells at LANL*, DOE/IG-0703, September 2005. The Inspector General found the following:

- i. DOE is not in compliance with DOE Order 450.1 *Environmental Protection Program*, which requires LANL to have a groundwater surveillance monitoring program in place by December 31, 2005.
- ii. "LANL did not adhere to specific constraints established by the Environmental Protection Agency for the use of drilling methods using muds and other drilling fluids. As a result, LANL could not assure that certain residual drilling fluids were fully removed." DOE IG, p. 2.
- iii. "Muds and other drilling fluids that remained in certain wells after construction created a chemical environment that could mask the presence of radionuclide contamination and compromise the reliability of groundwater contamination data." DOE IG, p. 2.

The data collected from these wells is unreliable. Yet, there are breakthroughs of contamination, such as hexavalent chromium. The levels of hexavalent chromium continue to rise above both Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and New Mexico standards.

Further, as stated in Appendix F of the draft LANL SWEIS, contaminants have moved off-site and are contaminating the drinking water wells for Los Alamos County and the Buckman Wellfield. Over 40% of Santa Fe's drinking water supply is located at the Buckman Wellfield. Appendix F documented neptunium-237 concentrations in Los Alamos County above the EPA drinking water standard. Strontium-90 levels were detected at a level 13 times the EPA drinking water standard.

This evidence alone indicates that there is an emerging environmental emergency at LANL and in order to protect public health and the environment, no new operations can begin there. DOE must include these facts in any analysis for expanded operations at LANL.

14. WIPP

The NOI neglected to mention WIPP, the nation's only repository for weapons waste. The site may be dramatically impacted by the proposed activities and as a result must be included in the analysis.

- a. WIPP is scheduled to be closed in 2030. What are the plans for future waste disposal after WIPP is closed?
- b. What will be the cost of future waste disposal?
- c. Please analyze the impacts of transportation of waste, not only to WIPP, but also to subsequent disposal facilities.
- d. Please analyze for the impacts of LANL becoming the second WIPP site in New Mexico.

15. International Consequences of the Proposal

"Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world's reach." *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*, also known as the Blix Report, p. 17. www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.

- a. Past Use of Nuclear Weapons by the United States: U.S. nuclear weapons activities have been the cause of international tragedy. The U.S. remains the only country that has used nuclear weapons in warfare. The consequences of this are apparent with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the horrific reality that the Hibakusha live with to this day and the tragedy imposed on the Marshall Islands and its Natives who withstood, but are suffering from, 67 atmospheric atomic tests. In all these instances, as well as the many nuclear tests that were conducted in the U.S., generations continue to bear the burden of this exploitation.

Therefore, CCNS requests that the Complex 2030 draft SEIS include analysis of the following:

- i. Historical and current consequences due to U.S nuclear weapons activities.
- ii. International consequences due to U.S. nuclear weapons activities.
- iii. Who has been impacted internationally, as well as, locally, regionally and nationally, by the proposed future activities.

- iv. Who has benefited from the past nuclear weapons activities.
- v. How the world has become a safer and more secure environment due to U. S. possession of nuclear weapons.
- vi. The recommendations provided in the recent report "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms," by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.
- vii. The environmental and health impacts both nationally and internationally from the Cold War arms race.

b. Reciprocal Reactions from Other States: The Complex 2030 proposal by the U.S. government, which includes new nuclear weapons designs, sends a clear message to the rest of the world of *do as I say, not as I do*. This message will provide non-nuclear States with the justification for their pursuit of a nuclear weapons arsenal and encourage nuclear states to both maintain and evolve their existing arsenals. Thus, the U.S. is paving the path for a new, more dangerous arms race that will include new opponents and new targets.

Therefore, CCNS requests that the Complex 2030 SEIS include within each alternative an analysis of:

- i. The potential for a new international arms race and the local, regional and international impacts.
- ii. How the world will be a safer, more secure environment with new nuclear weapons.
- iii. How the proposed alternatives will impact specifically Middle Eastern peace and security now and in the future. Recently, six Middle Eastern States declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that they have plans to pursue nuclear power capabilities. Iran is in the process of realizing its nuclear desires. In the case of Iran, the U.S has demonstrated a failure in diplomacy. The delicacy and vulnerability in the region is greatly impacted by U.S foreign policy. *Do As I Say, Not As I Do* is not a viable foreign policy.
- iv. Who will benefit from a reciprocal reaction from other states?
- v. Who will be impacted internationally, as well as, locally, regionally and nationally, by the proposed future activities?
- vi. Who will benefit from the proposed alternatives?
- vii. The environmental and human health impacts both nationally and internationally from the arms race that would be instigated by a reciprocal action from other States. In other words, an analysis of the environmental and health impact of restarting the Cold War.

c. IAEA Weapons Inspections: Inspections by IAEA of the U.S nuclear weapons complex and stockpile are rightfully due at this time. Without U.S cooperation with the United Nations (UN) and thorough inspections from the IAEA into U.S. nuclear strategic plans, complete global disarmament will never be realized. Further, by

neglecting to open doors into the U.S nuclear program to the IAEA, it shows the rest of the world that the U.S has something to hide. Such lack of transparency creates an environment of secrecy and undermines the IAEA, which allows for other countries to do the same.

Therefore, CCNS requests that the Complex 2030 document address:

- i. The reasons why the U.S has not opened the doors for inspections by the IAEA.
- ii. What the consequences and the benefits are of allowing such inspections to take place.
- iii. How such inspections by the IAEA would support positive U.S foreign relations.
- iv. Who would benefit from the U.S. continuing to keep the IAEA from inspecting the nuclear weapons arsenal.

16. Safety and Security

There are many safety and security issues at LANL and across the complex that threaten national security. Over the past decade alone, LANL has been inspected four times by the FBI. A recent federal court decision requires that the adverse consequences of potential terrorist attacks or intentional sabotage at DOE nuclear facilities must be analyzed. The draft Complex 2030 SEIS must:

- a. Evaluate the complex wide safety and security problems and include plans to address these issues.
- b. Include scenarios for terrorist attacks and analyze for them.

17. Health Impacts

DOE must be sure to take the full health impacts to all members of the public. There for the draft Complex 2030 SEIS must include analysis of:

- a. The impacts to young children and women.
- b. All health impacts related to exposure to radiation and the other contaminants generated during the proposed activities. The analysis must include, but should not be limited to, cancer fatalities, non-cancer effects, non-fatal instances of cancer and psychological impacts.
- c. The health impacts from the entire life cycle, from uranium mining to waste disposal. These must include transportation.
- d. The health impacts from pathways used by the indigenous people.

18. Environmental Justice

DOE/NNSA is required to analyze the Environmental Justice impacts that would result from the proposal. In order to effectively ensure Environmental Justice, DOE must:

- a. Speak with the communities surrounding the sites and along transportation routes regarding their current, traditional and foreseeable future use of the land and its resources in that area, including on the site itself. Areas but not limited to, the foods they eat, plants they use medicinally, sacred lands which are necessary for religious practices.
- b. Discover and speak with all tribes and communities who use the land and resources surrounding the proposed sites for sacred purposes. These peoples may live quite a distance from the site itself, such as the Hopi who use water from the LANL site.
- c. Analyze and evaluate for all Environmental Justice concerns. New Mexico has the highest majority of minority population in the 48 contiguous states. It is one of the poorest states in the nation and it has four sites that will be directly impacted by the Complex 2030 proposal.
- d. Include Environmental Justice analysis for transportation routes and disposal areas, private as well as public disposal areas.
- e. In March of 2006 the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD) issued a decisions that urged to “freeze,” “desist” and “stop” actions being taken or threatened to be taken against the Western Shoshone Peoples of the Western Shoshone Nation, including weapons activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Decision available at: http://www.shundahai.org/3-10-06UN_CERD_Decision_On_Western_Shoshone.html
 - i. What steps have been taken to fulfill the recommendations of the UN CERD at all of the proposed DOE sites?
 - ii. The NOI not only includes continued operations at the NTS, but proposes to build the consolidated plutonium facility there. Please provide a full explanation for how the United States can continue and consider increasing unapproved weapons operations at NTS?
 - iii. Please include a full list of nuclear weapons sites that are located on sacred and/or ancestral land.

The public comment hearings on the draft document must be held in such a way as to facilitate the meaningful involvement of all who will be impacted. Therefore, DOE/NNSA must:

- i. Provide daycare during the hearing.

- ii. Hold the hearings at each location both during the day, through lunch hour and at night to allow individuals to attend no matter what their schedule.
- iii. Hold the hearings in locations that are both convenient and easily accessible by public transportation.
- iv. Provide the opportunity to comment both in private and in public.
- v. Discuss the logistics of the meetings with community members in advance.
- vi. Hold hearings in Española or Pojoaque, New Mexico, in addition to the sites provided for in the scoping process.

19. Access to Documents

It is essential that the public have access to the documents as well as adequate time to review them in order to make informed comment.

- a. DOE must make the reference documents for the draft Complex 2030 SEIS available online as well as in CD form at the same time the Complex 2030 PEIS is released, if not before.
- b. The public must have at least 180 days to comment so as to adequately review these documents.

20. Reference Documents:

DOE must include the following documents in the review and analyses for the preparation of the draft Complex 2030 SEIS:

- a. *New Mexico's Right to Know: The Potential for Groundwater Contaminants from Los Alamos National Laboratory to Reach the Rio Grande* by George Rice, 2004. Available at www.nuclearactive.org
- b. *Early Warning: A Radioactive Rio Grande, CCNS and The RadioActivist Campaign*, 2003. Available at www.nuclearactive.org
- c. New Mexico's Right to Know: *New Mexico's Right to Know: The Impacts of LANL Operations on Public Health and the Environment*, 2003. Available at www.nuclearactive.org
- d. CCNS and the Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group (EVEMG) comments to the 2006 draft LANL SWEIS. Available at www.nuclearactive.org
- e. CCNS comments to the 2003 Modern Pit Facility EIS. Available at www.nuclearactive.org

- f. "Historic and Current Discharge from LANL," CCNS and Amigos Bravos, 2006. Available at www.nuclearactive.org.
- g. "Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms," also known as the "Blix Report." Available at www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons_of_Terror.pdf.
- h. "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn. The Wall Street Journal, January 4th 2007. Available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html>
- i. DOE Inspector General *Inspection Report: Characterization Wells at LANL*, DOE/IG-0703, September 2005.
- j. DOE Office of the Inspector General Audit Report: The Department's Management of Non-Nuclear High Explosives, June 2006. Available at: <http://www.ig.energy.gov/documents/IG-0730.pdf>
- k. "Pit Lifetime," JASON, November 20, 2006, Available at http://www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/JASON_Report- PuAging.pdf
- l. Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm>
- m. Constitution of the United States. Available at <http://www.law.emory.edu/cms/site/index.php?id=3080>
- n. "Bad to the Bone: Analysis of the Federal Maximum Contaminant Levels for Plutonium-239 and Other Alpha-Emitting Transuranic Radionuclides in Drinking Water," Arjun Makjijani, August 2005. Available at <http://www.ieer.org/reports/badtothebone/>
- o. "[Dangerous Discrepancies](#): Missing Weapons Plutonium in Los Alamos National Laboratory Waste Accounts," reissued in 2006, Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D. and Brice Smith, Ph.D. Available at <http://www.ieer.org/reports/lanl/weaponspureport.pdf>
- p. "[Soil Cleanup at Los Alamos National Laboratory](#): Sediment Contamination in the South Fork of Acid Canyon," Brice Smith, Ph.D, 2005. Available at <http://www.ieer.org/reports/lanl/cleanup.pdf>

q. United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decision on the Western Shoshone ancestral lands, March 2006. Available at [http://www.shundahai.org/3-10-06UN CERD Decision On Western Shoshone.html](http://www.shundahai.org/3-10-06UN_CERD_Decision_On_Western_Shoshone.html)

r. Comment letters from Rebecca Summer and Mike Mirzamani, which are attached to CCNS's comments.

In conclusion, implementation of any of the proposed alternatives for Complex 2030 would include decreasing the stockpile only to simultaneously replace them with new nuclear weapons. While CCNS supports the decreasing of the stockpile, CCNS does not support research, design or production to replace warheads that will remain in the stockpile. Such activities would compromise our commitments under the NPT, undermine sustainable international peace and security and risk a new arms race.

The alternatives provided in the Complex 2030 propose continued operations and production of nuclear weapons. A commitment to the refurbishment of our current nuclear weapons stockpile would create a dramatic shift in foreign policy. CCNS finds that these alternatives do not reflect the desire of many in the U.S. for total disarmament.

The scoping hearings for the draft Complex 2030 in Santa Fe, New Mexico demonstrated an overwhelming public concern for the proposals within Complex 2030. Furthermore, the public supported a fourth alternative that must include full compliance with Article VI of the U.S. Constitution and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The alternatives provided by DOE do not reflect the desires of the public. The DOE/NNSA must provide a fourth alternative that reflects total disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such an alternative will adhere to full compliance with the NPT.

Thank you for your careful consideration of our comments. Should you have any questions or comments, please contact CCNS at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Joni Arends
Executive Director

Sadaf Cameron
Public Education and Outreach Director

Kalliroi Matsakis
Media Network Director

Attachments