(4) April 4, 1968 memo from
DMA to 0S
In your memo of April 4, 1968, you requested (1) comments on the
LASL proposal to modify the OWR to meet the guidelines of 10 CFR
100 and (2) recommendations as to the most appropriate course of
action DMA should take to resolve the problem.
DRL, 0S and Dr. I. Van der Hoven (Environmental Sciences Services
Administration) have reviewed the latest meterial submitted.
Based on this review, our conclusions have not changed from those
indicated to you in my letter of October 31, 1967; i.e., based on
the information submitted to date, we cannot determine that the
OWR meets the siting guidelines, in 10 CFR 100. Therefore, we
cannot conclude that operation at 8 MW, or even at 5 MW, should
continue.
The meteorological study now underway will require almost a year
to complete. Our meteorology consultants feel that the results
of this study almost certainly will not provide evidence that
will assure that release of radioactivity will not occur over the
northern canyon wall into Los Alamos Our comments on LASL's
proposal to upgrade the OWR engineered safety features are
included in our enclosed evaluation. In summary the proposal does
not present sufficient analysis of the significant considerations
to conclude that there is reasonable assurance that the health
and safety of the public will not be endangered. In view of the
foregoing, considering the length of time since recognition of
the safety implications, and the fact that the proposal does not
provide an adequate solution, we recommend that immediate action
be taken to implement at least one of the following corrective
measures:
1. If, in the interest of National security, operation
should be continued apply to the General Manager for a
waiver of the normal safety requirements. If this course of
action is followed, we suggest that a temporary waiver be
requested and that, as soon as possible, action be taken to
carry out the upgrading recommended in item 3 below.
2. Limit the operation of the OWR such that the core fission
product inventory is kept low enough to prevent calculated
doses at the site boundary (following a puff release from
the hypothetical accident as described in U 3116) from
exceeding current criteria and guidelines of 10 CFR 100,
The contractor' a plan of action for compliance should be
submitted to AL for review and approval.
3. Cease operation until the reactor building is upgraded to
provide for confinement and a filter system to remove
radioactive iodine and particulates. This upgrading should
provide for maintaining building integrity and confinement
following the hypothetical accident. HQ review and approval
should be obtained for the proposed modification and
subsequent operation.
In summary we recommend that the OWR be operated only in the
interest of National security unless fission product inventory is
kept at very low levels or until the facility is upgraded.
original signed by
Martin B. Biles
Martin B. Biles,
Director
Division of Operational
Safety
Enclosure :
Evaluation
cc: D. J. Skovholt, DRL
I. Van der Haven, ESSA
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