SEP 3 1958

Raymond G. Stone, Ass istant Director
for Production
Division of Military Application


Reference:(1) 0S appraisal of AL Reactor Safety Program
ending December 1966;
(2) DMA memo and enclosures 1967, 0S
memo of October 1967 with enclosure (DRL-DOS review);
(3) November 17, 1967 memo from DMA to OS;
(4) April 4, 1968 memo from DMA to 0S

In your memo of April 4, 1968, you requested (1) comments on the LASL proposal to modify the OWR to meet the guidelines of 10 CFR 100 and (2) recommendations as to the most appropriate course of action DMA should take to resolve the problem.

DRL, 0S and Dr. I. Van der Hoven (Environmental Sciences Services Administration) have reviewed the latest meterial submitted. Based on this review, our conclusions have not changed from those indicated to you in my letter of October 31, 1967; i.e., based on the information submitted to date, we cannot determine that the OWR meets the siting guidelines, in 10 CFR 100. Therefore, we cannot conclude that operation at 8 MW, or even at 5 MW, should continue.

The meteorological study now underway will require almost a year to complete. Our meteorology consultants feel that the results of this study almost certainly will not provide evidence that will assure that release of radioactivity will not occur over the northern canyon wall into Los Alamos Our comments on LASL's proposal to upgrade the OWR engineered safety features are included in our enclosed evaluation. In summary the proposal does not present sufficient analysis of the significant considerations to conclude that there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered. In view of the foregoing, considering the length of time since recognition of the safety implications, and the fact that the proposal does not provide an adequate solution, we recommend that immediate action be taken to implement at least one of the following corrective measures:

1. If, in the interest of National security, operation should be continued apply to the General Manager for a waiver of the normal safety requirements. If this course of action is followed, we suggest that a temporary waiver be requested and that, as soon as possible, action be taken to carry out the upgrading recommended in item 3 below.

2. Limit the operation of the OWR such that the core fission product inventory is kept low enough to prevent calculated doses at the site boundary (following a puff release from the hypothetical accident as described in U 3116) from exceeding current criteria and guidelines of 10 CFR 100, The contractor' a plan of action for compliance should be submitted to AL for review and approval.

3. Cease operation until the reactor building is upgraded to provide for confinement and a filter system to remove radioactive iodine and particulates. This upgrading should provide for maintaining building integrity and confinement following the hypothetical accident. HQ review and approval should be obtained for the proposed modification and subsequent operation.

In summary we recommend that the OWR be operated only in the interest of National security unless fission product inventory is kept at very low levels or until the facility is upgraded.

original signed by
Martin B. Biles

Martin B. Biles, Director
Division of Operational Safety

Enclosure :
cc: D. J. Skovholt, DRL
I. Van der Haven, ESSA

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